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NO JOKES ABOUT DOPE: MORSE V. FREDERICK’S 
EDUCATIONAL RATIONALE 
Emily Gold Waldman
*
 
There is an undeniable irony to Morse v. Frederick.
1
  The majority 
opinion—which held that “schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to 
their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal 
drug use”2—is steeped in language about the dangers of drug use, particularly for 
youth.  But as far as pro-drug student speech goes, the speech at the center of 
Morse—Joseph Frederick’s “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner3—seems 
particularly unlikely to prompt anyone to actually take drugs and thus suffer 
those harms.  As a frustrated Justice Stevens wrote in dissent, “[t]he notion that 
the message on this banner would actually persuade either the average student or 
even the dumbest one to change his or her behavior is most implausible.”4  Yet in 
the majority’s eyes, the silliness of Frederick’s banner—along with his 
disclaimer of any intent to communicate a coherent message—actually seemed to 
harm rather than help his case.
5
  Why? 
The answer to this apparent inconsistency, I suggest, lies in a rationale 
lurking beneath Morse’s surface.  I have previously observed that two major 
rationales underlie the Supreme Court’s student speech framework for restricting 
student speech rights: protection and education.
6
  The protective rationale stems 
from the idea that student speech can sometimes pose a threat to other students or 
to the school environment itself, at which point school officials must step in to 
protect the school community from this potentially damaging speech.
7
  The 
educational rationale, meanwhile, holds that speech restrictions themselves can 
play a legitimate—indeed, important—role in teaching students about 
appropriate oral or written discourse.
8
 
Tinker v. Des Moines
9
 introduced the protective rationale, holding that 
schools could restrict student speech that threatened to materially disrupt the 
school or invade the rights of other students.
10
  Bethel School District v. Fraser
11
 
and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,
12
 in turn, relied on both the protective and 
educational rationales.  In concluding, respectively, that schools could restrict 
                                                                                                                         
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.  J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002; 
B.A., Yale University, 1999.  I thank Dan Weddle and the UMKC Law Review for inviting me to 
participate in this wonderful symposium. 
1 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
2 Id. at 397. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
5 See discussion infra Part II. 
6 See, e.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 
IND. L.J. 1113, 1121-22 (2010). 
7 Id. at 1121. 
8 Id. at 1122. 
9 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
10 Id. at 512-13. 
11 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
12 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
2 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3 
 
 
 
“plainly offensive” student speech13 and that schools could restrict school-
sponsored student speech out of any “legitimate pedagogical concerns,”14 the 
Fraser and Hazelwood Courts not only described the need to protect younger 
students from inappropriate or overly mature speech.  They also endorsed the 
schools’ central role in influencing the content of student speech by requiring it 
to be civil, appropriate, well-researched, well-written, and/or grammatical, as 
applicable.
15
 
Where, then, does Morse fit in?  An initial reading of Morse suggests 
that it is all about protection.  The majority holding was framed in terms of 
schools’ need to “safeguard those entrusted to their care” from pro-drug 
speech,
16
 and the majority never invoked the same sort of expressly educational 
justifications that the Fraser and Hazelwood Courts called forth.  But the 
protective rationale appearing on Morse’s surface only goes so far.  Morse makes 
real sense only when the educational rationale is pulled out of the decision’s 
subtext and added to the mix.  This rationale helps illuminate the Morse Court’s 
holding, the divisions between the various Morse opinions, and the case’s 
ultimate implications. 
This piece begins with a “protective” reading of Morse, showing how 
this rationale provides a good starting point in understanding Morse but is 
ultimately incomplete.  Indeed, Justice Stevens’ dissent is largely an argument 
that the protective rationale falls short here.  I then re-examine Morse from the 
perspective of the educational rationale and conclude that the underlying, largely 
unstated premise of the Morse majority is that schools—as part of teaching 
students about the gravity of drug use—should be able to convey disapproval of 
messages suggesting that drug use is a joking or trivial matter.  This helps to 
explain why Justice Stevens’ argument—that Frederick’s message was “stupid”17 
and that he was just seeking attention—was wholly unconvincing to the majority, 
which was disturbed by those very aspects of Frederick’s speech.  It also helps to 
explain Justice Alito’s concurrence, in which he distinguished between 
Frederick’s speech and any speech that could “plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on any political or social issue.”18  What harmed Frederick was that 
his speech minimized the seriousness of drug use while lacking the redeeming 
value of conveying a genuine message.  In Justice Alito’s eyes, a thoughtful 
argument for legalizing marijuana would deserve more protection than 
Frederick’s banner, regardless of whether the former might actually have greater 
potential to persuade at least some students to experiment with it.  I conclude 
with some reflections about why the Court left Morse’s educational rationale in 
                                                                                                                         
 
13 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
14 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
15 See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681-83, 685-86.. 
16 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (emphasis added). 
17 Id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
18 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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the subtext, rather than explicitly articulating it, and what this suggests for how 
the Supreme Court is approaching student speech cases. 
I.  A “PROTECTIVE” READING OF MORSE 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that students sometimes need 
protection from their fellow students’ speech.  In Tinker, the Court held that 
schools could restrict speech that was likely to materially disrupt the school 
environment or invade the rights of other students.
19
  Lower courts have relied on 
those prongs to uphold, for instance, restrictions on student speech of a 
threatening nature,
20
 racially inflammatory speech (particularly in school districts 
with a history of unrest),
21
 and severely harassing or bullying speech.
22
  Fraser 
and Hazelwood added to the list of protective justifications for restricting certain 
student speech.  They each suggested that it is appropriate for schools to try to 
shield their younger students from language or ideas that are too explicit or 
mature for them.
23
 
Morse is steeped in protective language.  The majority devoted numerous 
paragraphs to the problem of illegal drug use.
24
  It explained that drug abuse “can 
cause severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being of young 
people,”25 that statistics indicate that “[t]he problem remains serious today,”26 
and that schools—at Congress’s direction—have adopted policies specifically to 
convey that drug use is “wrong and harmful.”27 
If all the majority had to do was convince readers of the dangers of drug 
use for youth, it clearly accomplished that goal—not a very difficult one, after 
all.  But the leap from the dangers of drug use to the dangers of Frederick’s 
speech was more difficult.  Usually when the protective rationale is invoked, the 
idea is that the student speech itself may cause some imminent harm—for 
example, a riot, a fistfight, or perhaps younger students’ exposure to language or 
concepts for which they are not emotionally ready.
28
  Here, however, the link 
                                                                                                                         
 
19 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
20 See, e.g., Cuff v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012). 
21 See, e.g., Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010). 
22 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
23 See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (stating that educators should be able to 
restrict school-sponsored student speech to ensure that “readers or listeners are not exposed to 
material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (stating that Fraser’s speech “could well be seriously damaging to its less 
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of 
human sexuality”). 
24 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407-08 (2007). 
25 Id. at 407. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 408 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2000)). 
28 See, e.g., Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 334-35 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding school’s 
ban on Confederate flag displays was justified given evidence of “racial violence, threats, and 
tension at Clinton High School,” which had led lower court to conclude that the flag was likely to 
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between the speech and the danger was far more attenuated.  In trying to make 
this connection, the majority quoted a statement in Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
in Board of Education v. Earls
29—a case involving drug testing, not speech about 
drugs—that “the single most important factor leading schoolchildren to take 
drugs” is peer pressure.30  But this argument was a stretch.  There, Justice Breyer 
had been discussing evidence that students with friends who use drugs are more 
likely to use drugs themselves.
31
  He was not addressing pure pro-drug speech 
unaccompanied by action.  Moreover, even accepting the notion that true peer 
pressure can prompt some students to use drugs, Frederick’s banner was a far cry 
from conventional forms of peer pressure (e.g., “I don’t want to hang out with 
you if you won’t do drugs too,” “Everyone’s going to be doing drugs at the party, 
so you probably shouldn’t come if you don’t want to do that,” “Why don’t you 
just try them once?,” etc.).  The majority was left to argue that while “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS” probably meant “nothing at all”32 to some students, others might 
interpret it as stating “[Take] bong hits,” or “bong hits [are a good thing],”33 and 
that the banner thus qualified as “celebrating illegal drug use.”34  From here, the 
majority generalized that speech that could be “reasonably regarded as promoting 
illegal drug use” posed a “serious and palpable” danger.35 
The majority thus forced the school’s suppression of Frederick’s banner 
into a protective frame.  To some extent, the framing works.  After all, the 
principal asked Frederick to take his banner down pursuant to a school board 
policy that prohibited any “public expression that . . . advocates the use of 
substances that are illegal to minors.”36  That broader rule, as the Morse majority 
explained, clearly had a protective justification, insofar as it swept in pure peer 
pressure.
37
  Frederick’s banner, in turn, could reasonably be regarded as violating 
that rule.  The more generalizing the majority did—the farther it moved away 
from the substance of Frederick’s actual banner—the easier it was to make the 
protective case for ruling in the school’s favor. 
Similarly, Justice Alito’s concurrence argued in protective terms: 
[D]ue to the special features of the school environment, school officials 
must have greater authority to intervene before speech leads to 
violence. . . . 
Speech advocating illegal drug use poses a threat to student safety that 
is just as serious, if not always as immediately obvious.  As we have 
recognized in the past and as the  opinion of the Court today details, 
                                                                                                                         
lead to unrest). 
29 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
30 Id. at 840 (Breyer, J., concurring), cited in Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. 
31 Earls, 536 U.S. at 840 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
32 Morse, 551 U.S. at 401. 
33 Id. at 402. 
34 Id. at 402. 
35 Id. at 408. 
36 Id. at 398. 
37 Id. at 410. 
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illegal drug use presents a grave and in many ways unique threat to the 
physical safety of students.  I therefore conclude that the public schools 
may ban speech advocating illegal drug use.
38
 
Justice Alito did not even attempt to argue that Frederick’s particular banner 
posed a threat to other students’ safety.  Instead, like the majority, he generalized 
about speech that advocates illegal drug use and proceeded from there. 
Justice Stevens’ dissent, in turn, turned the focus back to Frederick’s 
banner itself, which he variously described as “nonsense,”39 “ridiculous,”40 
“silly,”41 and “stupid.”42  To Justice Stevens, the fact that Frederick was just 
seeking to get the camera crews’ attention—rather than convince his fellow 
students to do anything—shed a “revelatory light”43 on this case.  He made two 
main points.  First, he argued that Frederick’s speech lacked “a meaningful 
chance of making otherwise-abstemious students try marijuana.”44  He thus 
suggested—albeit not in those exact words—that the protective rationale fell 
short here.  Second, somewhat inconsistently with his first argument that 
Frederick had not been conveying any substantive message, Justice Stevens 
argued that the majority had been deaf to the fact that the war on drugs and the 
legalization of marijuana were issues of public concern and debate, particularly 
in Alaska.
45
  He thus concluded that the majority’s approach conflicted with “the 
constitutional imperative to permit unfettered debate.”46 
These two arguments were wholly unconvincing to the majority.  The 
majority did not even respond to the dissent’s first point, which addressed the 
shortcomings of the majority’s protective rationale.  (After all, if Frederick’s 
speech was unlikely to prompt any students to use drugs, why did they need to be 
protected from it?)  This, I believe, is because the majority knew that it had 
overstated the protective case, at least as it applied to Frederick’s banner.  The 
majority also knew, however, that its reasoning did not rest on protective grounds 
alone.  It thus responded solely to the dissent’s second point, which pressed on 
the educational rationale underlying the majority’s thinking by suggesting that 
schools should encourage, or at least not squelch, political debate among their 
students.  I now turn back to Morse to view it through this educational lens.  
                                                                                                                         
 
38 Id. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring). 
39 Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 438. 
41 Id. at 444. 
42 Id. at 445. 
43 Id. at 433. 
44 Id. at 441. 
45 Id. at 446 & n.8. 
46 Id. at 445. 
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II.  AN “EDUCATIONAL” READING OF MORSE 
The educational rationale for restricting student speech can be traced 
back to Fraser.  There, the Court held that the school’s suspension of Matthew 
Fraser, who delivered a student counsel speech laced with sexual innuendo, could 
be punished not only because his speech could have seriously damaged younger 
students in the audience, but also because “schools must teach by example the 
shared values of a civilized social order.”47  The Court explained that the school 
was entitled to punish this student to “make the point to the pupils that vulgar 
speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of 
public school education,”48 and later concluded that “[t]he First Amendment does 
not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd 
speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational 
mission.”49  In other words, the punishment would serve as a lesson to this 
student-speaker—and other student-listeners—about “the habits and manners of 
civility as values in themselves.”50  The Hazelwood Court explicitly invoked 
educational justifications as well, holding that schools had great leeway to restrict 
school-sponsored student speech in order to convey disapproval of speech that 
was “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or 
prejudiced, [or] vulgar or profane.”51 
The Morse majority did not explicitly use these sorts of educational 
justifications in upholding the school district’s punishment of Frederick’s speech.  
But they are lurking just beneath the surface.  Most telling are the divergent 
reactions of the majority and dissent to Frederick’s testimony that he had not 
intended to address fellow students with his banner, and was instead just trying to 
get the camera crews’ attention so that he could appear on TV.52  For Justice 
Stevens, who devoted most of his dissent to debunking the protective 
justifications for punishing Frederick’s banner, this information was “revelatory” 
because it proved that there was no need to protect any students from Frederick’s 
speech.
53
  Frederick was not trying to pressure students to take drugs—he hadn’t 
even been speaking to them!  “[A] speaker who does not intend to persuade his 
audience can hardly be said to be advocating anything,” Justice Stevens 
reasoned.
54
  Indeed, while Frederick’s intentions here are not dispositive—it is 
possible for a student’s speech to collaterally harm another student even when 
                                                                                                                         
 
47 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
48 Id. at 685-86. 
49 Id. at 685. 
50 Id. at 681. 
51 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
52 See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
53 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 433 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. at 444. 
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that was not the intention—they do at least weaken the protective justification for 
restricting Frederick’s speech as a type of peer pressure. 
The majority, however, clearly viewed the evidence about Frederick’s 
motivations as supporting, rather than undermining, its conclusion that school 
officials were entitled to restrict Frederick’s speech.  Indeed, it emphasized that, 
contrary to the dissent’s observation that drug policy is a matter of significant 
public debate, “[n]ot even Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of 
political or religious message.”55  If the majority were proceeding from a 
protective rationale alone, that acknowledgment by Frederick would be, at best, 
irrelevant.  The key question would be the likely effect of Frederick’s banner 
itself on other students, and Frederick’s testimony that he was not trying to 
communicate anything to them would only help his case.  The educational 
perspective, however, focuses on the lesson that the student-speaker (and other 
students) will learn from how the school responds to the speech.  From this 
standpoint, Frederick’s motives for uttering the speech were more significant and 
damaging.  Had he been trying to convey a political message—say, an argument 
that drug use did little harm and should be legalized—he would at least have 
been contributing to debate on a serious issue, something that schools are 
preparing their students to do in their role as citizens.  If the school were to 
suppress such speech, the take-away lesson for students would be more 
problematic.  Here, however, Frederick was trivializing drug use merely to get 
attention and fulfill his own personal ambition of appearing on television.  This 
rendered him less sympathetic from an educational perspective and made it more 
justifiable for the school to respond negatively to his speech. 
Further harming Frederick, from the perspective of the educational 
rationale, was that he displayed his banner right in front of school officials, 
essentially flouting their own repeated teachings about the dangers of drugs.
56
  
Notice that the Morse majority repeatedly returned to this point, stating that 
Frederick unfurled his banner “in the presence of teachers and fellow students”57 
and that student speech “celebrating illegal drug use at a school event, in the 
presence of school administrators and teachers . . . poses a particular challenge 
for school officials.”58  Again, the fact that school officials were present when 
Frederick delivered his message would seem, at best, irrelevant under the 
protective rationale.  If anything, it might be more dangerous for a student to 
deliver a pro-drug message in an unsupervised setting at school (e.g., while 
students are on their lunch break) where other students can start using drugs right 
away.  But from the educational rationale, this fact was significant because of its 
“in your face” nature: Frederick was essentially mocking school officials and 
their anti-drug teachings.  Thus, Frederick not only trivialized drug use—in direct 
                                                                                                                         
 
55 Id. at 403 (majority opinion). 
56 Id. at 400-01. 
57 Id. at 402 (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at 408 (emphasis added). 
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opposition to a school districts’ charge, traceable all the way to Congress, to 
teach students about the gravity of drug use—but he arguably did so in a way that 
lacked civility and respect. 
The majority thus held that Principal Morse was entitled to respond in 
order to teach Frederick—and his fellow classmates—that drugs were no joking 
matter.  This comes through most clearly in the end of the opinion, where the 
majority stated that Principal Morse reasonably concluded that “failing to act 
would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, including 
Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug 
use.”59 
This educational reading of the majority’s opinion helps to explain why 
Justice Stevens’ dissent and the majority opinion were like two ships passing in 
the night.  Justice Stevens’ dissent responded to the majority’s surface language 
about protecting students from pro-drug advocacy by trying to prove that 
Frederick’s speech would not actually prompt students to do anything.  But the 
majority was also concerned about something different here: preserving schools’ 
ability to negatively respond to student speech that trivialized drug use.  And 
Justice Stevens’ dissent had nothing to say about that.  Indeed, his argument that 
some pro-drug speech has political content further called attention to the lack of 
such content in Frederick’s banner itself. 
The educational reading also sheds light on Justice Alito’s concurrence, 
which even more starkly emphasized the distinction between speech that simply 
advocates illegal drug use and speech that “can plausibly be interpreted as 
commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on issues such as 
‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.’”60  
If protection were the main rationale here, that distinction would make little 
sense; both categories of speech might well be equally likely to prompt students 
to experiment with drugs.  But from an educational perspective, the second 
category has a redeeming value—giving students room to develop their capacity 
as citizens commenting on issues of public concern—while the first category 
does not.  Relatedly, Professor John Taylor has observed: 
To advocate the legalization of marijuana or any other drug is to imply 
that drug use is not so bad or dangerous as conventional wisdom would 
suggest; and if tolerance of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” signals a lack of 
commitment in the school’s anti-drug message, it is unclear why 
tolerance of “Legalize Marijuana” does not do the same thing.  The 
difference in treatment must be a function of the content of the speech.  
“Legalize marijuana” is political advocacy, traditionally high-value 
                                                                                                                         
 
59 Id. at 410 (emphasis added). 
60 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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speech; “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” is (at least in the Court’s eyes) an 
incitement to illegal action, traditionally low-value speech.
61
 
While I agree with Taylor that Justice Alito was making a value 
judgment about the two categories of speech, I think the educational 
justification—unique, within the First Amendment setting, to the public school 
context—provides an important added dimension here.  The Court did not (and 
really could not) make the claim that the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner 
qualified as an incitement to illegal action.  Even describing Frederick’s banner 
as “advocacy of illegal drug use”62 was a stretch.  Although some student pro-
drug speech, including peer pressure, can fall into this category, Frederick’s 
speech did not.  Yet the Court was willing to lump Frederick’s banner in with 
purer forms of advocacy in order to give schools more latitude to “make the point 
to the pupils”63 that trivializing drug use—particularly right in the face of school 
officials was inappropriate and inconsistent with the school’s anti-drug teachings. 
But this educational rationale—though a necessary piece of the Morse 
puzzle—remained in the decision’s subtext.  Why?  Why not articulate it more 
explicitly?  This question becomes particularly intriguing upon an examination of 
the papers submitted to the Supreme Court by the Morse defendants and their 
amici.  Such a review, as I discuss in the next section, reveals that the defendants 
repeatedly brought this educational rationale to the Court’s attention and framed 
the case in those terms.  I thus turn to these papers and then explore why the 
Supreme Court refused to follow—explicitly, at least—the defendants down this 
path. 
III.  EXPLAINING THE SUBTEXTUAL STATUS OF MORSE’S 
“EDUCATIONAL” RATIONALE 
The Morse defendants’ (and their amici’s) submissions to the Supreme 
Court repeatedly indicated their recognition that this particular case was about 
something other than pure pro-drug advocacy.  When the Morse school district 
defendants filed their petition for a writ of certiorari, for instance, they asked the 
Supreme Court to rule on whether school districts were entitled to restrict student 
speech “advocating or making light of illegal substances.”64  A subsequent 
amicus curiae brief from the National School Boards Association (“NSBA”) 
argued that Fraser meant that schools could regulate “student messages 
promoting or trivializing drug use.”65 
                                                                                                                         
 
61 John E. Taylor, Why Student Religious Speech Is Speech, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 223, 230 (2007). 
62 Morse, 551 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added). 
63 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (No. 06-278), 2006 WL 2506659 at 
*12 (emphasis added). 
65 Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association, American Association of School 
Administrators, and National Association of Secondary School Principals in Support of Petitioners 
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Moreover, the defendants and their amici emphasized the educational, 
rather than the purely protective, justifications for restricting Frederick’s speech.  
The defendants’ subsequent brief on the merits argued that Frederick’s banner 
“expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana use” and that this message was 
“directly contrary to the school’s basic educational mission of promoting a 
healthy, drug-free lifestyle.”66  Similarly, the NSBA argued that “messages 
touting illegal drug use” were “inimical to fundamental school and civic 
mores.”67 
As described above, however, the Court refused to follow the defendants 
down this path, instead insistently framing the case in protective terms.  Indeed, 
the Court explicitly declined to use any part of Fraser as the basis for upholding 
the school’s restriction of Frederick’s speech, instead carving out its new, narrow 
pro-drug speech exception that it justified on protective grounds.
68
  There are, I 
believe, two key reasons for why the Court did so. 
First, the defendants—and in particular, some of their amici—went too 
far in their briefs.  They did not just assert that student speech trivializing drug 
use implicated unique educational concerns, given the general societal 
consensus—and Congressional directive—that schools should educate students 
about the gravity and danger of drug use.  Instead, they suggested that schools 
should have broad rein to restrict all sorts of speech that conflicts with their self-
defined educational mission.  The defendants, for example, stated that “Fraser 
permits schools to prohibit student speech that undermines the basic educational 
mission.”69  The United States, also an amicus curiae for the school district, 
similarly did not limit itself to a discussion of pro-drug speech, but cited 
Hazelwood for the proposition that “a school need not tolerate speech that is 
inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission.’”70  The NSBA took this 
argument even further.  It emphasized that: 
The determination of whether student speech is at odds with 
schools’ educational mission should be vested in school boards, which 
establish policies based on local community standards, and who are 
intimately familiar with the “facts on the ground” that may make an 
expression perceived as innocuous or unremarkable in one school 
community, so inflammatory and divisive in another one that it 
interferes with the educational process.
71
 
                                                                                                                         
12, Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 140999 at *12 (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
Brief of NASB et al. in Support of Petitioners]. 
66 Brief for Petitioner at 25, Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 118979 at *25. 
67 Brief of NASB et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 65, at 29. 
68 Morse, 551 U.S. at 404. 
69 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 66, at 21.  The defendants placed particular emphasis on this 
assertion by casting it as an argument point heading.  See id. 
70 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 
478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)), cited in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 6, Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 118978 at *6. 
71 Brief of NASB et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 65, at 15. 
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In support, the NSBA approvingly cited a Texas district court that had allowed a 
school to broadly censor sex-related speech on grounds that it conflicted with the 
school’s “abstinence-only” curriculum.”72 
The NSBA thus asked the Supreme Court to use Morse as a vehicle for 
providing school officials with extremely broad discretion to restrict student 
speech.  Indeed, the NSBA even asked the Court to rule that Principal Morse 
would have been entitled to restrict Frederick’s banner under Tinker’s “invasion 
of rights” prong on grounds that the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” phrase might have 
been offensive to “devout Christian students.”73  Not only would this have been 
an unprecedented expansion of Tinker, but the school itself had not even tried to 
justify its actions on that basis. 
Advocacy groups supporting Frederick were deeply disturbed by these 
broad-reaching arguments,
74
 and the Supreme Court was apparently concerned as 
well.  During oral arguments, the Justices repeatedly pressed the advocate for the 
school district on this issue, quickly prompting a retreat back to a drug-specific 
focus.  Consider, for example, the following exchange: 
MR. STARR: The argument is that this Court in Tinker articulated a 
rule that allows the school boards considerable discretion both in 
identifying the educational mission and to prevent disruption of that 
mission, and this is disruptive of the mission— 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, suppose you have—suppose you have a 
mission to have a global school.  Can they ban American flags on lapel 
pins? 
                                                                                                                         
 
72 Id. at 16 (citing Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 563 (N.D. Tex. 
2004)). 
73 Id. at 20-21. 
74 An interesting mix of groups filed amicus briefs on Frederick’s behalf, ranging from the Student 
Press Law Center and the National Coalition Against Censorship to six conservatively-oriented 
religious advocacy groups, including the Christian Legal Society, the Liberty Legal Institute, and 
the American Center for Law and Justice.  For further discussion of this point, see, e.g., Emily Gold 
Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Hurtful Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 
J.L. & EDUC. 463, 463-65, 484-86 (2008).  The Liberty Legal Institute, for instance, wrote:  
What amicus fears most is that a loosely worded opinion, holding that students 
have no First Amendment right to promote drug use, will fatally undermine 
protection for core religious and political speech in public schools.  The vague 
and deferential standard proposed by Petitioner and her amici invites this 
consequence. 
Brief for Liberty Legal Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Morse, 551 U.S. 
393 (2007) (No. 06-278), 2007 WL 550930, at *5. 
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MR. STARR: Absolutely not, because under Tinker that is political 
expression.  Let me be very specific.  This case is ultimately about 
drugs and other illegal substances.
75
 
Similar exchanges permeated the oral argument.
76
 
To emphasize that it was not endorsing the larger argument that schools 
could restrict any speech that undermined their self-defined educational mission, 
the Court bent over backwards to avoid any explicitly educational justifications 
in its opinion.  The Court’s framing of this case in protective terms, even though 
they did not quite fit Frederick’s banner, was thus intended to communicate a 
larger message.  To ensure this message was lost on no one, the majority opinion 
included the following statement: 
Petitioners urge us to adopt the broader rule that Frederick’s 
speech is proscribable because it is plainly “offensive” as that term is 
used in Fraser.  We think this stretches Fraser too far; that case should 
not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some 
definition of “offensive.”  After all, much political and religious speech 
might be perceived as offensive to some.  The concern here is not that 
Frederick’s speech was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use.
77
 
Justice Alito’s concurrence similarly highlighted and criticized this 
argument.  He wrote: 
The opinion of the Court does not endorse the broad argument 
advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment 
permits public school officials to censor any student speech that 
interferes with a school’s “educational mission.”  This argument can 
easily be manipulated in dangerous ways, and I would reject it before 
such abuse occurs.  The “educational mission” of the public school is 
defined by the elected and appointed public officials with authority 
over the schools and by the school administrators and faculty.  As a 
result, some public schools have defined their educational missions as 
                                                                                                                         
 
75 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Morse, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (No. 06-278), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-278.pdf. 
76 See, e.g., id. at 8-9. 
JUSTICE ALITO: Are you arguing that there should be a sui generis rule for 
speech that advocates illegal drug use, or this broader argument that the school 
can suppress any speech that is inconsistent with its educational mission as the 
school . . . defines it? 
MR. STARR: . . . The Court can certainly decide this on very narrow grounds, 
that there are certain substances, illegal drugs, we would include alcohol and 
tobacco, that’s part of the school’s policy, because those are illegal substances 
which are very injurious to health. 
77 Morse, 551 U.S. at 409 (citation omitted). 
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including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held 
by the members of these groups.
78
   
Thus, by insisting that this case was only about drugs and the need to 
protect students from pro-drug speech, the five justices in the Morse majority 
tried to distance themselves from the broader arguments made by the school and 
its amici. 
But something else was also at work here.  The Morse Court did not 
overstate the protective case for restricting Frederick’s banner solely to rebuke 
the overly broad educational rationales advanced by the school and its allies here.  
I believe the Court also did so because it was genuinely conflicted about the 
strength and breadth of the educational rationale.  Most of the justices rejected 
the NSBA’s contention that school boards and officials should be able to define a 
school’s “educational mission” based on local community standards to the point 
where speech that would seem innocuous in one school might be proscribable in 
another.
79
  But over the past few decades, a majority of the Court has also 
accepted that, at least in certain cases, student speech can be prohibited on 
educational rather than purely protective grounds, as exemplified by Fraser, 
Hazelwood, and now Morse (if you are convinced by my argument).  What the 
Court has not settled on or articulated is the dividing line for when the 
educational rationale is acceptable and when it is not.  And this is a very difficult 
question.  As Professor Douglas Laycock, who also wrote an amicus brief for 
respondent Frederick, later reflected: 
No one objects when schools forcefully indoctrinate the viewpoint that 
it is wrong to hit other children, or that it is wrong to steal their 
property.  At the other extreme, few schools are so politically foolish as 
to seek to inculcate the idea that the Republican Party, or the 
Democratic Party, is the only hope for the country . . . . 
. . . .  
We are unlikely to find a bright line between “Don’t hit” and 
“Support the Republican Party.”  There is a continuum from 
uncontroversial ideas to controversial ones, from ideas that are 
accepted as part of the school’s mission to ideas that almost certainly 
would not be if the issue were squarely raised.
80
 
                                                                                                                         
 
78 Id. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
79 See Brief of NASB et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 65, at 15.  The one justice who 
accepts this view is Justice Clarence Thomas, who indeed believes that “the Constitution does not 
afford students a right to free speech in public schools.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 418-419 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  This, of course, would give schools free rein to ban any student speech of their 
choosing. 
80 Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public School: 
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 111, 117-19 (2008). 
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Professor Richard Garnett made a similar argument  in his article, “Can 
There Really Be ‘Free Speech’ in Public Schools?”81  Reflecting on the 
complexities of applying the First Amendment here, he observed 
[H]ow can a constitutional provision whose aim, many think, is to 
constrain the government from interfering in or directing a diverse and 
pluralistic society’s conversations about the common good be 
incorporated into a context in which the state—again, that which this 
constitutional provision binds—is exercising “managerial” authority for 
the purpose of producing not just certain facilities, but certain core 
values, loyalties, and commitments? . . . Public K-12 schools . . . seem 
more like anti-First Amendment—or, perhaps, pre-First Amendment—
institutions.
82
 
Garnett is thus not surprised that the Morse opinions “never squarely addressed” 
what he views as the “most intriguing question” posed by the case: “What is the 
mission—i.e., the ‘basic educational mission’—of public schools?”83 
Laycock and Garnett thus helpfully identify and articulate the thorny 
inquiry at the root of Morse: if we accept the idea that schools have some sort of 
educational mission, how broadly should this mission be defined, and when does 
protecting that mission justify limiting student speech that undermines it?  
Framing the case in protective terms enabled the Supreme Court to avoid 
explicitly addressing this question.  But I have tried to show here that the Court 
did answer this question, at least implicitly and incrementally.  Morse only makes 
complete sense if you read it as endorsing the view that schools, as part of their 
educational mission, can disapprove of—and restrict—student speech suggesting 
that drugs are a trivial or joking matter.  It is unfortunate that the Court, in its 
efforts to avoid the overly broad rationale advanced by the school and its allies, 
refused to say that explicitly.  Doing so not only would have made the Morse 
decision itself much clearer, but it also would have contributed to the difficult 
project of fleshing out, through careful case-by-case analysis, exactly how 
broadly the educational rationale for restricting student speech should extend. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Upon first reading of Morse, Joseph Frederick seems to have been in a 
no-win position.  The Supreme Court faulted him for advocating illegal drug use, 
yet his argument that “the words were just nonsense meant to attract television 
                                                                                                                         
 
81 See Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 45 (2008). 
82 Id. at 58-59. 
83 Id. at 47 (citation omitted) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675, 685 
(1986)).  Garnett later reflected: “No wonder the Court continues to struggle to formulate free-
speech doctrine that takes into account [K-12 public schools’] special characteristics.”  Id. at 59 
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
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cameras”84 hurt his case, too.  Viewing the case through both the protective and 
educational lenses makes clear that there are really two different types of student 
pro-drug speech that Morse allows schools to restrict: (1) genuine advocacy, 
which is unprotected for protective reasons; and (2) speech that trivializes drug 
use, like Frederick’s banner, which is unprotected for largely educational 
reasons.  This examination also sheds light on the narrow category of student 
pro-drug speech that retains robust First Amendment coverage: speech that 
qualifies as legitimate political or social commentary.
85
  Here, the educational 
reasons for schools to allow such speech outweigh the protective and educational 
concerns cutting the other way.  Frederick himself was in a no-win position, but 
students whose speech falls into this remaining category should fare better.  What 
remains to be seen is how the educational rationale itself will evolve as the 
Supreme Court continues to develop its student speech jurisprudence.  Morse 
reveals a Court that accepts the educational rationale to some extent, but is 
uncomfortable and conflicted about it. 
                                                                                                                         
 
84 Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), 
vacated, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)). 
85 This is the category that Justice Alito singled out for protection in his concurrence.  See id. at 422 
(Alito, J., concurring).  Although Justice Alito joined the majority as well, he provided the crucial 
fifth vote for the Court’s holding, and thus his reasoning warrants careful attention.  Moreover, the 
majority itself, in emphasizing that Frederick had disclaimed any intent to convey a political or 
religious message, appeared sympathetic to this view.  Id. at 403 (majority opinion). 
